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OBLIGATIONS OF TENDERERS AND
BID BONDS IN CANADA
DAVID

I.

BRISTOW*

A party's obligation to follow through with a contract when
its tender has been accepted has proven to be a problematic
matter in Canada. This issue has arisen most often with respect
to alleged forfeitures under bid bonds that provide for payment
of a penal sum if a tenderer does not honour its tender. In The
Queen (Ontario) v. Ron Engineering & Construction (Eastern)
Ltd." the Supreme Court of Canada finally bestowed some clarity in an area that previously had been characterized by confusion and contradiction. American lawyers might wish to compare
the Canadian approach to that taken by the Supreme Court of
2
California in Drennan v. Star Paving Co.

The impact of Ron Engineering on the law of bid bonds
must be evaluated against a background of the older case law.
Bid bonds have been the subject of several Canadian decisions
that recognize that the bid bond works a forfeiture and that circumstances may exist in which equity must step in and relieve
against forfeiture.
Canadian case law predates the widespread use of modern
bid bonds. The first case was Brandon Construction Co. v. Saskatoon School Board,' a trial decision in the Saskatchewan Supreme Court. The tenderer, Brandon Construction (Brandon),
made a cash deposit with its tender as a gesture of good faith. In
fact, the tender documents referred to the contractor's cash deposit as a "guarantee of good faith."4 The court interpreted
these words to mean that the tender was made in good faith and
that if this tender was accepted, the tenderer would enter into
* Partner, Fraser & Beatty, Toronto, Canada. B.A., University of Toronto, Victoria College, 1953; J.D., Osgoode Hall Law School, 1957. Appointed Queen's Counsel,
1969.
1. [1981] 1 S.C.R. 111 (Can.).
2. 2.51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
3. [1912] 5 D.L.R. 754 (Sask. S. Ct.).
4. Id. at 756.
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the necessary contract. According to the court, the contract language meant that if the tender was accepted but the tenderer
refused to enter into a contract, then the deposit would be forfeited to the school board.'
The problem that eventually came before the court in Brandon was discovered by the tenderer only when his bid was accepted. Brandon recalculated its tender price and found that it
could not complete the contract at a profit, and, therefore,
sought to withdraw its tender.
The school board declared that the construction company
had forfeited the deposit, and Brandon sued for its recovery. At
trial the court dismissed the plaintiff's action, but on appeal
Brandon persuaded the court that its deposit in reality was a
penalty, as opposed to a genuine pre-estimate of damages.
Therefore, the school board could not keep the deposit. The
court would have allowed the forfeiture only if satisfied that the
amount of the deposit was a genuine pre-estimate of the school
board's damages.' Throughout the early cases, courts persisted
in treating bid deposits as forfeitures requiring equitable relief.
The advent of compensated suretyship in the Canadian
marketplace compelled use of the bid bond. This bond provided
for payment of the lesser of either (1) the penal sum stated in
the bond or (2) the difference in contract values between the
bonded tender and the next accepted tender. The bid bond was
successful in avoiding the law against penalties because its wording contemplated payment of the actual damages sustained by
the owner, with the penal sum as an upper limit or "upset
amount."
In Hamilton Board of Education v. U.S.F. & G. a bid bond
was before the court. The outbreak of the Korean War had intervened between preparation of the contractor's tender and its
acceptance, thereby escalating all labour and material prices by
7% to 15% and leaving the tenderer with an unavoidable
$50,000 loss before he even began construction. Learning of this
loss, the contractor notified the owner that the tender was with-

5. Id. at 757.
6. See Ron Eng'g & Constr. E. Ltd. v. The Queen (Ont.), 24 O.R.2d 332 (Ct. App.
1979).
7. [1960] O.R. 594 (High Ct. of Justice).
8. Id. at 597.
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drawn. The board immediately called upon the bid bond, but
the surety denied liability. The court concluded that the ordinary rules of contract law applied in the case of construction
contracts and that a tender, therefore, was merely an offer subject to acceptance. The tender, as an offer, could be withdrawn
at any time prior to acceptance.9 The court also held that the
bid bond had no validity apart from the tender it supported;
consequently, only if a tender was accepted in accordance with
the laws applying to all contracts could the bond properly be
called on."0
In Hamilton Board of Education the tender or offer had
been nullified by withdrawal before the owner could have accepted it. Thus, the owner could not properly claim on the bid
bond - notwithstanding the fact that on its face, the withdrawal appeared to be the very event upon which the bond was
conditioned.
Subsequent to Hamilton Board of Education further refinement in the law of bid bonds occurred in Belle River Community Arena Inc. v. W.J.C. Kaufmann Co.," a decision authored
by Mr. Justice Southey in the Trial Division of the Supreme
Court of Ontario. In this case, after having submitted its tender
to the owner, the contractor discovered that it had missed one of
seventy-five "summary sheets" 12 used in preparing its tender.
The result was that the $600,000 tender was more than $70,800
below its intended value. 13 Perhaps aware of the Hamilton
Board of Education decision, the owner attempted to take advantage of the contractor's error by accepting the tender even
after notice of the error. Thereafter, the owner commenced an
action upon the bid bond. The owner further cemented its position by immediately entering into a formal contract with the
4
next highest bidder.

In the course of reaching a decision on the various issues of
the case, the trial judge carefully considered the various steps
that an obligee should take as a condition precedent to making a

9.
10.
11.
1978).
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 599.
Id.
15 O.R.2d 738 (High Ct. of Justice), appeal dismissed, 20 O.R.2d 447 (Ct. App.
Id. at 740.
Id.
Id. at 740-41.
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valid claim on a bid bond. The condition of the particular bid
bond in the Belle River case was as follows:
Now,

THEREFORE, THE CONDITION OF THIS OBLIGATION is

such that if the aforesaid Principal (Kaufman) shall have the
tender accepted within sixty (60) days from the closing date of
tender and the said Principal will, within the time required,
enter into a formal contract and give the specified security to
secure the performance of the terms and conditions of the Contract, then this obligation shall be null and void; otherwise the
Principal and the Surety will pay unto the Obligee the difference in money between the amount of the bid of the said Principal and the amount for which the Obligee legally contracts
with another party to perform the work if the latter amount be
in excess of the former."

The court held that in order to make a claim on the bid
bond, the obligee-owner needed to obtain an unequivocal refusal
from the tenderer before expiration of the sixty-day period that
the tender stipulated for acceptance. 16 Because the contractor
had not been presented a contract for unequivocal refusal, the
court denied the claim against the bonding company.
These decisions must now be read together with the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Ron Engineering.1 7 In this
case, Ron Engineering had delivered a $150,000 cash deposit
with its tender of $2,748,000. After submitting its tender, the
contractor discovered that it had failed to include a $750,000
item for "own force's" work. 8 The information for tenderers
stipulated the following:
Except as otherwise herein provided the tenderer guarantees
that if his tender is withdrawn before the Commission shall
have considered the tenders or before or after he has been notified that his tender has been recommended to the Commission
for acceptance or that if the Commission does not for any reason receive within a period of seven days as stipulated and as
required herein, the Agreement executed by the tenderer, the
Performance Bond and the Payment Bond executed by the
tenderer and the surety company and the other documents re15. Id. at 744.
16. Id.
17. [1981] 1 S.C.R. 111 (Can.).
18. Id. at 114-15.
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quired herein, the Commission may retain the tender deposit
for the use of the Commission and may accept any tender, advertise for new tenders, negotiate a contract or not accept any
tender as the Commission may deem advisable. 9
In Ron Engineering, however, the owner did not make the
same mistake as the owner had in the Belle River case. Immediately after being notified of the tenderer's mistake, the owner in
Ron Engineering attempted to protect its position with respect
to the bid deposit by presenting to Ron Engineering a contract
in the prescribed form for execution. Particularly noteworthy is
the fact that the owner did not execute the contract before
presenting it to Ron Engineering; the court, however, did not
base its decision on this issue. Since the "Information for Tenderers" in the construction contract did not require the owner to
execute the contract before presentment to the tenderer, the
court held this fact to be irrelevant.2"
In accordance with earlier decisions, the Ontario Court of
Appeal held that the owner could not accept a tender after it
was informed that the tender was mistaken in some fundamental term.2 On this point, however, the Supreme Court of Canada
overturned the Ontario Court of Appeal. The court noted a provision in the information for tenderers, which provided that the
tenderer could not withdraw its tender for a period of sixty days
after submission without also forfeiting its bid deposit.22 Ron
Engineering had taken the interesting position in every court below that it had not withdrawn its tender 2 but, rather, that the
owner's knowledge of a mistake in a fundamental term of the
tender prevented him from accepting the tender.2 4
Justice Estey for the Supreme Court of Canada held that
this provision in the information for tenderers created a separate
and unilateral contract, which he termed "contract A," arising
upon the very submission of a tender. The court recognized the
existence of a practice in the construction industry, as distinct
from other commercial situations, and formulated the following

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

113-14.
118-19.
117.
113-14.
120.
116.
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restatement of the position of an obligee respecting the bid
deposit:
The test, in my respectful view, must be imposed at the time
the tender is submitted and not at some later date after a demonstration by the tenderer of a calculation error. Contract A
(being the contract arising forthwith upon the submission of
the tender) comes into being forthwith and without further
formality upon the submission of the tender. If the tenderer
has committed an error in the calculation leading to the tender
submitted with the tender deposit, and at least in those circumstances where at that moment the tender is capable of acceptance in law, the rights of the parties under contract A have
thereupon crystallized. The tender deposit, designed to ensure
the performance of the obligations of the tenderer under contract A, must therefore stand exposed to the risk of forfeiture
upon the breach of those obligations by the tenderer. Where
the conduct of the tenderer might indeed expose him to other
claims in damages by the owner, the tender deposit might well
be the lesser pain to be suffered by reason of the error in the
preparation of the tender.2 5
The "contract A" analysis used in Ron Engineering has
been followed in Gloge Heating & Plumbing Ltd. v. Northern
Construction Co. 26 and Town of Slave Lake v. Appleton Con-

struction Ltd. The Supreme Court of Canada reaffirmed this
analysis in Northern Construction Co. v. City of Calgary.28 In
Calgary the trial judge followed the principle set out in the Belle
River decision that an unequivocable refusal to enter the contract is a prerequisite to claim the bid bond. The Alberta Court
of Appeal, in a divided decision, overturned the trial judgment;
the Supreme Court, citing the "contract A" approach of Ron
Engineering, upheld this decision.29
The Canadian approach as set down in Ron Engineering
should be compared with that taken by the Supreme Court of
California in Drennan. In Drennan a paying subcontractor attempted to revoke a tender upon which a general contractor had
relied in successfully obtaining a contract to build a school. The
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 121-22.
27 D.L.R.4th 264 (Alta. Ct. App. 1986).
53 A.L.R.2d 177 (Alta. Q.B. 1987).
[1987] 2 S.C.R. 757 (Can.).
Id. at 758.
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tender was silent as to the subcontractor's right of revocation.
The subcontractor however, contended that the tender was a result of a mistake and that it was entitled to revoke the tender.
The court found for the general contractor in an action for damages, ruling that the general contractor's reasonable reliance on
the tender made it irrevocable.
In reaching its decision, the court cited section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts: "A promise which the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action or forebearance of a definite
and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which
does induce such action or forebearance is binding if injustice
'30
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
The court concluded that the subcontractor had reason not
only to expect that the general contractor would rely on its
tender, but also to desire that the general contractor should do
so. 31 In coming to this conclusion, the court considered whether
the subcontractor had a duty to be careful in preparing its
tender due to the foreseeable harm that the general contractor
would suffer if its tender turned out to be mistakenly produced.
Although not determining whether damages for such negligence
might be recoverable, the court did apply these considerations in
concluding that the general contractor was within the protection
of the doctrine expressed in section 90 of the Restatement of
3
Contracts. 1
The court also considered whether an implied term of revocation existed in the circumstances, but found that this was not
the case. In its reasoning on this point, the court drew analogy
to section 45 of the Restatement of Contracts, 3 which concerns
offers for unilateral contracts. According to section 45, unilateral
contracts include subsidiary promises that prevent revocation of
an offer after an offeree has acted in detrimental reliance upon
the offer. 4
A comparison of Ron Engineering and Drennan is instruc-tive. The Supreme Court of Canada also referred to the doctrine
of unilateral contracts in its decision, but in a different manner

30. RESTATEMENT
31. 51 Cal. 2d at

90 (1932) [hereinafter Restatement].
761 P.2d at 760.

OF CONTRACTS §
-,

32. Id.
33. RESTATEMENT, supra note 30, § 45.
34. Id.
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than did the Supreme Court of California. In Ron Engineering
the offer in the unilateral contract was made by the owner; the
tenderer accepted the offer to bring contract A into existence. In
Drennan the analogy was such that the subcontractor was the
offeror, and thereby under the doctrine of section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts,35 reasonable reliance would make the
offer irrevocable.36
Contrast this with the contract A approach in Ron Engineering, whereby the Supreme Court of Canada found submission of the tender to crystallize a contract distinct from the contract that was to govern the actual contemplated construction.
Experience will show whether the construction bidding process
in Canada has been served well by a legalistic approach that apparently supplants a notions of fairness and reasonable reliance,
the cornerstones of Drennan.

35. RESTATEMENT supra note 30, § 90.
36. 51 Cal. 2d at -, 761 P.2d at 760.
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